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Executive Summary
This master’s thesis reports on security of a Cyber-Physical System (CPS) in the department of
industrial engineering at UiT campus Narvik. The CPS targets connecting distinctive robots in the
laboratory in the department of industrial engineering. The ultimate objective of the department
is to propose such a system for the industry.
The thesis focuses on the network architecture of the CPS and the availability principle of
security. This report states three research questions that are aimed to be answered. The questions
are: what a secure CPS architecture for the purpose of the existing system is, how far the current
state of system is from the defined secure architecture, and how to reach the proposed architecture.
Among the three question, the first questions has absorbed the most attention of this project. The
reason is that a secure and robust architecture would provide a touchstone that makes answering
the second and third questions easier.
In order to answer the questions, Cisco SAFE for IoT threat defense for manufacturing [1] ap-
proach is chosen. The architectural approach of Cisco SAFE for IoT, with similarities to the Cisco
SAFE for secure campus networks [2], provides a secure network architecture based on business
flows/use cases and defining related security capabilities. This approach supplies examples of sce-
narios, business flows, and security capabilities that encouraged selecting it. It should be noted that
Cisco suggests its proprietary technologies for security capabilities. According to the need of the
project owners and the fact that allocating funds are not favorable for them, all the suggested secu-
rity capabilities are intended to be open-source, replacing the costly Cisco-proprietary suggestions.
Utilizing the approach and the computer networking fundamentals resulted in the proposed secure
network architecture. The proposed architecture is used as a touchstone to evaluate the existing
state of the CPS in the department of industrial engineering. Following that, the required security
measures are presented to approach the system to the proposed architecture.
Attempting to apply the method of Cisco SAFE, the identities using the system and their
specific activities are presented as the business flow. Based on the defined business flow, the
required security capabilities are selected. Finally, utilizing the provided examples of Cisco SAFE
documentations, a complete network architecture is generated. The architecture consists of five
zones that include the main components, security capabilities, and networking devices (such as
switches and access points). Investigating the current state of the CPS and evaluating it by the
proposed architecture and the computer networking fundamentals, helped identifying six important
shortcomings. Developing on the noted shortcomings, and identification of open-source alternatives
for the Cisco-proprietary technologies, nine security measures are proposed. The goal is to perform
all the security measures. Thus, the implementations and solutions for each security measure is
noted at the end of the presented results.
The security measures that require purchasing a device were not considered in this project.
The reasons for this decision are the time-consuming process of selecting an option among different
alternatives, and the prior need for grasping the features of the network with the proposed security
capabilities; features such as amount and type of traffic inside the network, and possible incidents
detected using an Intrusion Detection Prevention System.
The attempts to construct a secure cyber-physical system is an everlasting procedure. New
threats, best practices, guidelines, and standards are introduced on a daily basis. Moreover, business
needs could vary from time to time. Therefore, the selected security life-cycle is required and
encouraged to be used in order to supply a robust lasting cyber-physical system.
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1 Introduction
Industry is the part of an economy that produces material goods which are highly mechanized and
automatized. As yet, there have been four technological leaps that led to paradigm shifts (industrial
revolutions): in the field of mechanization, of the intensive use of electrical energy, of the widespread
digitalization, and the present combination of Internet technologies and future-oriented technologies
in the field of smart objects (machines and products). The fourth paradigm shift was established
as Industry 4.0, the term being a reminiscence of software versioning [3].
Industry 4.0 is the current trend of automation and data exchange in manufacturing technologies.
It includes cyber-physical systems, the Internet of things and cloud computing, creating what has
been also called as a smart factory. All the technologies which Industry 4.0 includes, indicates the
fact of high connectivity between the components and to the Internet.
As it could be seen in figure 1.11, manufacturing was the most invested industry in Internet of
Things (IoT) solutions in 2016. The predictions even indicate a growth in the near future. For
instance, Meticulous Research2 has reported about an increase in the expected investment and
forecasts 263.4 billion dollars market size by 2027[4].




Figure 1.2: High-level reference model adapted from [7]
Industry 4.0[3] takes a great interest from manufacturing companies. It facilitates dealing with
huge data volumes, developing human-machine interactive systems and improving communication
between the digital and physical environments [5]. To provide a better explanation of this concept,
a high-level reference model based on the Purdue Model [6] tailored to the scope of this project
has been proposed in figure 1.2 [7]. The first layer indicates the manufacturing process (level 0).
Level 1 and 2 represent OT layers, including Supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA),
Remote Terminal Unit (RTU), Programmable Logic Controller (PLC), Distributed Control System
(DCS), and Human Machine Interface (HMI). Layer 3 is an intermediate layer with system classified
in-between IT and OT, while layer 4 corresponds to the IT part of a corporation. The highest layer
(layer 5), not appeared in the original Purdue model, is specific for smart manufacturing, where
external services are commonly used (Software as a Service (SaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS),
and Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS)). It should be noted that new communication paths introduced
by Industry 4.0 and enabled by the incorporation of IIoT devices into the network, are added with
yellow arrows to emphasize their criticality in terms of security and privacy.
Industry 4.0 includes three essential stages. Firstly, gathering digital records through sen-
sors that attached to industrial assets, which collect data by closely imitating human feelings and
thoughts, also knows as sensor fusion. Secondly, analyzing and visualizing step which includes an
implementation of analytical abilities on the captured data (From signal processing to optimiza-
tion, visualization, cognitive and high-performance computation, etc). Many different operations
are performed with background operations. Thirdly, the stage of translating insight to actions
involves converting the aggregated data into meaningful outputs, such as additive manufacturing,
autonomous robots and digital design and simulation [5].
According to European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) Industry 4.0/Smart manufac-
turing assets are classified into key groups depicted in figure 1.3 [7]. ENISA, also, suggests a short
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description of each components [7]. The figure expands on different types of components involved
in Industry 4.0/smart manufacturing.
Cybersecurity is one of the main technological pillars to fully implement Industry 4.0, shown in
figure 1.4 [8]. Moreover, the large investment, connectivity of components, and use of the Internet,
as mentioned earlier, would be some of the other reasons to consider the cybersecurity as a core
concern.
1.1 Research questions
This master’s thesis aims for the security of Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) in general, and establish-
ing a more secure system for the existing CPS in the department of industrial Engineering at Arctic
University of Norway (UiT) campus Narvik. The scope of security and security in cyber-physical
systems is vast. It covers from the most tangible facts, such as physical security of components of
a network, to the security of processes inside the Central Process Unit (CPU). The focus of this
project is on the network and architecture. An architecture provides the required logical orienta-
tion of security capabilities3 that must be considered when selecting products to ensure that the
documented business flow, threats, and requirements are met. An architecture could provide many
designs based on performance, redundancy, scale, and other factors [2, p.22]. In this section the
main questions that this thesis emphasizes on is presented.
Research Question 1: What is a secure Cyber-Physical System for the purpose of the existing
system in the department of industrial engineering at UiT campus Narvik?
If there is no clear definition for a secure cyber-physical system for the purpose of the project owner,
no security measures could be accomplished. Therefore, in the first place, a secure cyber-physical
system which addresses the stakeholder’s need (the department of industrial engineering at UiT
campus Narvik) is to be sketched. This sketch would assist measuring the security level of the
current system and the required steps for enhancing it. This question draws the majority of the
attention of the thesis.
In order to answer the question, Cisco SAFE [11], i.e. SAFE for IoT Threat Defense for Manufac-
turing [1] and SAFE for campus networks [2], are enabled. Other standards and guidelines, such
as NIST 800-82 [12] and SANS[13] were also utilized. The fundamental concepts of routing and
switching [14, 15, 16] (in line with the background of the author) were also considered to depict a
secure network architecture. Moreover, studying the security of OPC Unified architecture as the
most critical element of the network (expanded in section 2.10) assisted the process.
Research Question 2: How secure is the current Cyber-Physical System?
A detailed analysis of the current level of security brings attention to both threats and possible
solutions. This question indicates the standing position of the system and how far it is from being
relatively secure.
Sketching a secure CPS architecture for the case would ease grasping the security level of the
existing CPS. A robust and trustworthy architecture would provide a goal and measurement scale
for the security of a cyber-physical system. Thus, the shortcomings of the existing CPS is presented
by comparing the proposed secure system and the current system as the next step of the thesis.
Research Question 3: How to approach the defined secure Cyber-Physical System?
3A combination of mutually-reinforcing security controls (i.e., safeguards and countermeasures) implemented by
technical means (i.e., functionality in hardware, software, and firmware), physical means (i.e., physical devices and
protective measures), and procedural means (i.e., procedures performed by individuals). [9, 10]
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Figure 1.3: Industry 4.0 asset taxonomy [7]
10
Figure 1.4: Technological pillars of Industry 4.0, adapted from [8]
Lastly, some security measures have been undertaken in order to proceed toward a more secure
cyber-physical system. These actions intend to bring the system to the proposed architecture and
a more secure state.
There are a number of alternatives for the proposed security capabilities (provided as an answer to
the first research question). Since Cisco SAFE suggests Cisco-proprietary security capabilities, in
this project, the commonly used open-source alternatives are suggested and implemented, provided
by security experts and benchmarks.
The details about the approaches toward answering the questions are found in section 3.
1.2 Outcomes
A secure network architecture for the purpose of the stakeholder (department of industrial engi-
neering) is presented as the first expected outcome. Afterwards, based on the defined secured ar-
chitecture and network computing fundamentals, six important shortcomings of the current system
are noted. Subsequently, nine measures for enhancing the security level of the system is provided.
1.3 Road map
In this section, the steps and challenges which were encountered throughout the project are stated.
This statement would assist in clarifying the road map undertaken during the thesis. Table 1
presents an overview of the challenges.
In the first place, the main question is the definition of security. Is it only a concept, a component
like Firewall, or a product? The well-known security materials, such as Convery’s book [17], help
to perceive the concept.
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Step No. Challenge description
1 Definition of security
2
Relation of guidelines, standards, risk assessments,
and best practices to security system
3
Finding the related guidelines, standards, risk assessments,
and best practices
4
Generating a security system based on the selected materials
(standards, ...)
5 Selecting alternatives for Cisco-proprietary security capabilities
Table 1: Challenges encountered throughout the project
When searching for security and security of CPS through articles, a number of articles introduce
attacks and distinct categorization. Numerous best practices and guidelines will be also encountered
when reading through different standards, such as NIST and ISO. Being lost in an amount of security
threats with different categorization for them, some solutions, and a number of best practices could
be the consequence of this extent and variety.
Another challenge is grasping whether applying the best practices and the guidelines make a
system safe and secured or not. What if there is a new best practice announced? Should everything
be started over? Therefore, a system or a life-cycle containing all concepts and leading to a routine is
craved. This is where Cisco Security Life-cycle, figure 3.6, assists with connecting all best practices,
guidelines, standards and risk assessments together and understand their roles for a security system.
Once a life-cycle for security is selected, the challenging point would be finding the proper poli-
cies, guidelines, standards, best practices and risk assessments related to Cyber-Physical Systems.
The next case would be generating a security system based on the selected materials. Here is
where Cisco SAFE approach for IoT aids. Cisco SAFE proposes an architecture-based approach, in
which four fonts (Segmentation, Visibility and Analysis, Remote Access, and Secure Services) are
considered to overcome any threats and further secure the system. The proposed solution of Cisco
(Cisco SAFE for IoT Threat Defense for Manufacturing) gathers different standards and existing
models, including ones for classic computer networks that Cisco has been focused on for long,
and yields a business-flow-centered mechanism. Cisco recommends different security capabilities,
such as network management and firewall, regarding the mentioned four fonts. The recommended
architecture and security capabilities have valued the thesis as a starting point for understanding
the application of different standards and guidelines, plus a foundation that the suggested security
system of this project is built upon and intended to be improved over the time.
After designing the network architecture and identifying the required security capabilities, im-
plementing the designed network ensues. The key challenge during the implementation phase is
identifying open-source alternatives for the security capabilities proposed in Cisco SAFE. The pro-
posed security capabilities are mostly Cisco proprietary and costly.
1.4 Structure of the thesis
A short introduction about Industry 4.0 and the importance of cybersecurity, the questions, ex-
pected outcomes, and challenges of this thesis were discussed as yet. In this section a brief descrip-
tion of the following sections and their contribution within the thesis are offered.
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Section 2 covers the state-of-the-art, the necessary concepts (or references to materials) for
grasping the article, and a description of the existing CPS in the department of industrial engineer-
ing. Section 3 expresses the chosen methods for generating the results. Afterwards, the provided
answers to the stated research questions are presented in three different subsection respectively
(since there are three different research questions), section 4. In section 5 the opinions related to
the results, and further works are discussed. Eventually, conclusion of the thesis are supplied in
section 6.
2 Background and Literature Review
This section provides the state-of-the-art in this field of study, and a summarized background
of the required knowledge for clarifying the provided methods and results. After presenting the
state-of-the-art, a summarized description of cyber-physical systems and OPC unified architecture
is expressed in section 2.2 and 2.3. Thereupon, definition of security (section 2.4), the utilized
security capabilities, and services (section 2.5-2.9) are mentioned. Next, the security threats related
to cyber-physical systems and dynamic host configuration protocol are introduced. Eventually, the
existing CPS at UiT campus Narvik is introduced.
2.1 State-of-the-art
A number of articles in this field of study focus on different cyber attacks, their effects on the
systems and classify them. Ding [18] presents an overview of recent advances on security control and
attack detection of industrial CPSs. Amin [19] focuses on the risks that arise from interdependent
reliability failures (faults) and security failures (attacks). Alguliyev [20] includes the main types of
attacks against cyber-physical systems and a analyzes them. His categorization was also adapted
in this paper.
Several articles cover the physical aspect of Cyber-Physical Systems. Cheh’s article [21] proposes
to protect critical infrastructure systems by assessing the safety of the system and using models
that integrate they cyber, physical, and human domains for detecting malicious physical threats on
the system. Niu [22] considers an optimal controller by using Q-learning for the physical system
with uncertain dynamics, since the cyber system under attack will affect the physical system. He
models the linear discrete-time system with dynamics that is unknown and altered by the cyber
state vector, including packet losses and time delays as two important metrics for the network that
may cause deterioration or potential instability of the system [23]. Then the optimal control gain is
introduced and the system stability only when the cyber state vector satisfies a certain criterion is
shown. If the state vector of the cyber system fails to satisfy the criterion, the appropriate defense
is launched. Niu adapts the Q-function update law and development of the system dynamics from
Xu et al [24]. The performance of the strategy is evaluated for the cases that there is a degradation
of performance for physical systems.
Furthermore, there are some articles focusing on introducing new approaches for evaluating se-
curity of different systems. For instance, Shreshta focuses on an approach of security classification;
in which, generally systems (IoT systems), based on their impact and exposure are divided into
classes [25, 26, 27]. Garitano provides a methodology together with a Multi-metrics 4 approach
4Multi-Metrics is a simple process which evaluates the repercussion of each metrics component or sub-system,
based on its importance within the system [28, p.1371]
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to evaluate the system security, privacy and dependability (SPD) level during both the design and
running processes [28]. National Institute of Standard and Technology (NIST) [29] has also sug-
gested a framework. The framework uses a common language to address and manage cybersecurity
risk in a cost-effective way based on business and organizational needs, without replacing additional
regulatory requirement on business.
2.2 Cyber-Physical Systems
The Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) term was proposed by Helen Gill at the National Science
Foundation (NSF) CPS workshop conducted by the US NSF in 2006. From computer science point
of view, CPS are the integration of computing and physical process [30]. They include embedded
computers, network monitors and controllers, usually with feedback, where physical processes affect
computations and vice versa [20]. According to Alguliyev [20], some of the most important and
distinctive characteristics of a CPS are:
 Input and possible feedback from the physical environment
 Distributed management and control
 Uncertainty regarding reading, status and trust
 Real-time performance requirements
 Wide-distribution geographically, with components in locations that lack physical security
 Multi-scale and systems of systems control characteristics (systems-of-systems).





The current state of the CPS includes variables that present data obtained by sensors and control
variables representing control signals. The normal value of a certain parameter, called a set point,
is considered and the distance between the values of the process variables and corresponding control
point is calculated by the controllers. After calculating this offset, the controllers, using a complex
set of equations, develop a local actuation, and compute new actuation and control variables. The
received control value is sent to the corresponding actuator to keep the process closer to a specific
point; PID controllers could be named as an example.
It should be noted that the controllers also send the received measurements to the main control
servers and execute the selected commands from them. In CPS, system operators should be aware of
the current status of the controlled objects. Thus, the graphical interface (GUI), called the human-
machine interface (HMI), provides the current state of controlled object to the human operator
[20]. Figure 2.1 presents the role of human in CPSs and how human decisions effects the system.
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Figure 2.1: Illustrating the human role and interaction with cyber-physical systems, adapted from [31]
2.3 OPC Unified Architecture
The OPC Unified Architecture (UA), released in 2008, is a platform independent service-oriented
architecture 5. It is in the common area of IoT, Industry 4.0, and Machine-to-machine communi-
cation (M2M), figure 2.2 [32]. OPC UA is built on the success of OPC classic and was designed to
enhance and surpass the capabilities of its classic version.
OPC UA, as an International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) standard (IEC 62541), en-
ables connecting machines together, exchanging data, and communication between different man-
ufacturing products [34, 35]. Being flexible, suitable for different embedded systems, and different
Operation Systems (Windows, macOS, and Linux), forms it to be a popular option. It operates
with a client-server model [36]; the server fetches and shares data.
Woopsa6 and RT-Middleware [37] are two open-source alternatives for OPC UA. Since they are
not supported by manufacturing simulation software, such as Visual components 7 and RoboDK 8,
they were not utilized as a part of the CPS of the department of industrial engineering [38].
2.4 Security






Figure 2.2: The common data connectivity and collaboration standard for local and remote device access in IoT, M2M, and
Industry4.0 adapted from [33]
The fundamental question in the first place is ”What is security?”. According to Convery’s book
[17], security could become subjective and complementary in cases (this book is also an important
source because it is a base for Cisco SAFE approach which is the method of ours). He defines some
axioms as follows:
”When I say ”axiom” in this book, I am referring to overarching design principles,
considerations, or guidelines that are broad enough to apply to all areas of secure network
design. Axioms are similar to design principles but are subtly different. A design
principle is smaller in scope and often involves only a single technology or affects only
a limited area of the network. For example, that the intrusion-detection system (IDS)
should be installed as close as possible to the hosts you are trying to protect is a design
principle.”
The axioms are:
 Network Security is a System: Security is not a firewall, IDS, VPN, Authentication,
Authorization and Accounting (AAA). Security is not anything that Cisco System or any
of its competitors can sell. Network security system is a collection of network-connected
devices, technologies, and best practices that work in complementary ways to provide security
to information assets. The key word in that definition is complementary. A complementary
technology that applies to a specific threat pattern is needed, which some refer to as ”defense-
in-depth”. In the book it is referred to as a practical method of determining the quality of your
system, breaking down the quantity, and makeup of the various deployed threat mitigation
techniques (protect, detect, deter, recover and transfer), similar to NIST Framework [29].
 Business priorities must come first: It is necessary to ensure that businesses are able to
continue to evolve.
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 Network Security promotes good network design: The most effective way to improve
pre-exisitng network security is to logically divide the network into functional modules. A
network design provides the infrastructure and serves the matter of segmenting the network
into smaller modules as one of its most important services.
 Everything is a target: Any components of a network could be a target for attacks.
Although there is no doubt that Internet-reachable servers (such as web servers and proxy
servers) are one of the highest-profile targets, focusing on protecting only those systems will
leave a design lacking in many areas.
 Everything is a weapon: One of the biggest reasons that everything is a target is because
nearly everything (computers, routers, ...) could be used as a weapon. An attacker is moti-
vated to acquire weapons to wield against future targets. Therefore, nearly every successful
attack has not only a direct result for the attacker, but also an indirect gain for using against
new targets. The notion of using your own systems as weapons against you is critical for the
attacker’s success.
 Strive for operational simplicity: In layman’s terms, achieving operational simplicity
means the difference between a security system that works for you and a security system that
you work for.
 Good network security is predictable: Predictability is required to implement a success-
ful security system. in other words:
– Assuring that the activity and events the system might experience is understood, includ-
ing attack vectors.
– Considering how to construct a system that mitigates these attacks.
– Considering failure conditions that might arise within your own system to ensure the
design is layered.
the work does not stop with the security design, operational processes must be considered to
ensure the ability to deal with a security incident properly.
 Avoid security through obscurity: Security through obscurity is not security. This does
not mean that obscurity mechanisms are never meant to be used. It means you should never
rely on them.
 Confidentiality and security are not the same: Security is the protection of systems,
resources, and information from unintended and unauthorized access or misuse. While confi-
dentiality is the protection of information to ensure that it is not disclosed to unauthorized
audience. Here we can refer to the famous CIA (Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability) triad,
figure 2.3, which has been expended during the time (mentioned in section 2.10).
2.5 Firewalls
Firewalls are the principal element in many secure network designs. As NIST has expressed [39],
firewalls are devices or programs that control the flow of the network traffic between networks or
hosts that employ differing security postures. While firewalls are often discussed in the context of
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Figure 2.3: The classic CIA Triad
Internet connectivity, like the focus in the early days of its existence [40], they also have applicability
in other network environments. For example, many enterprise networks employ firewalls to restrict
connectivity to and from the internal networks used to service more sensitive functions, such as
accounting and personnel. By employing firewalls to control connectivity, an organization is able
to prevent unauthorized access to its systems and resources. It could be said that inclusion of a
proper firewall provides an additional layer of security.
Several types of firewall technologies exist. One way of comparing their capabilities is to look
at the TCP/IP protocol suite layers that each is able to examine. Basic firewalls operate on
one or a few layers (typically the lower layers) while more advanced ones investigate all of the
layers. The ones which investigate more layers are able to perform more thorough examinations.
The application layer firewalls, potentially, accommodate advanced application and protocol and
provide services that are user-oriented. As an example, it could enforce user authentication and log
events to specific users. A notable point is that firewalling is often combined with other technologies
- most notably routing and Network Address Translation (NAT) [41] (which is actually a routing
technology). Moreover, some firewalls include Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) technologies too.
Firewalls are often placed at the perimeter of a network. Such firewalls have one or many internal
and external interfaces with the external interface being on the outside of the network. They are
also sometime referred as unprotected and protected. Since the firewall’s policies could operate
in both directions we would avoid ”protected” and ”unprotected” terms and will use internal and
external for such firewalls. Generally, as NIST [39] mentions, ten firewall technologies could be
arranged in the following sub-sections:
2.5.1 Packet Filtering
The most basic feature of firewalls is packet filtering. The old firewalls that were only packet filters
were essentially routing devices that provided access control functionality for host addresses and
sessions. The devices with only such functionality are also knows as stateless inspection firewalls
which do not keep track of the state of each flow of traffic that passes through them. For example,
they are not able to associate multiple requests within a single session to each other. Packet
filtering is the core of most modern firewalls, but, nowadays, there are a few firewalls sold that
are only capable of stateless packet filtering. Their access control functionality is based on a set of
directives (rule-set). Packet filtering capabilities are built into most operation systems (OS) and
devices capable of routing, such as routers and Access Control Lists (ACL). The access control could
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Source Address Source Port Destination Address Destination Port Connection State
192.168.1.1 1032 192.168.3.2 433 Established
192.168.1.5 1030 192.168.3.2 433 Initiated
192.168.3.6 1033 192.168.2.6 80 Established
Table 2: Example of the State table of a stateful firewall
be done based on: source IP, destination IP, network or transport protocol, ports and interfaces.
Packet filters own some drawbacks. Stateless packet filters are generally vulnerable to attacks and
exploits which take advantage of problems within TCP/IP specification and protocol stack. For
instance, they are unable to detect spoofed or altered network layer addressing information. On the
other hand, firewalls that operate at higher layers (TCP/IP layers) are able to detect some spoofing
attacks by verifying the establishment of a session or authenticating users before allowing traffic
to pass. Moreover, packet fragmentation has been used for attacking; in which, some network-
based attacks have used packets that should not exist in normal communication, such as sending
fragments of a malicious packet but not the first fragment, or packet fragments that overlap each
other. To prevent such use of fragmentation, fragmented packets could be blocked that could also
cause interoperability issues of Virtual Private Networks (VPN). Some firewalls could reassemble
fragments before passing them, although it requires additional resources, particularly memory. They
should be configured carefully, since a denial-of-service attack could be mounted too. Choosing
whether to block, reassemble, or pass fragmented packets is a trade-off between overall network
interoperability and full system security. Nevertheless, automatic blocking of fragmented packets
is not recommended according to NIST guidelines on firewalls and firewalls policy [39], because of
applicability of fragmentation on the Internet.
2.5.2 Stateful Inspection
It improves on the functionality of packet filters by tracking the state of connections and blocking
packets that differ from the expected state. Incorporating greater awareness of the transport layer
enables this feature. The tracking is done inside a table called state table and the table contents
varies between firewall products. Although, the contents of the table, typically include source IP,
Destination IP, port number, and connection state information.
Three major states exist for TCP traffic (establishment, usage, termination). Each new packet
is verified by state of the connection listed in the state table. For example, if an attacker claims the
packet to belong to an established connection while the state table expressed a different state of
connection, the packet is filtered. Stateful firewalls could also consider the TCP sequence numbers
and NAT information. Regarding connection-less protocols such as UDP, stateful firewalls are only
able to track the source and destination IP addresses and ports and the packets must still match
an entry in the state table. For example, a Domain Name System (DNS) [42] response from an
external source must match a corresponding DNS query. An instance of a state table is presented
in table 2.
2.5.3 Application Firewalls
A newer trend in stateful inspection is the addition of a stateful protocol analysis capability, also
called deep packet inspection. It improves upon standard stateful inspection by adding basic in-
trusion detection technology. Intrusion detection technology analyzes application layer protocols
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to compare vendor-developed profiles of harmless protocol activity against the observed events, for
example, identifying denied attachment types of emails, blocking connections over which specific
actions are being performed, or inspecting contents of web pages.
Application firewalls could also identify unexpected sequence of command which would cause
buffer overflow, DoS, Malware and HTTP attacks. More importantly, they could validate input
of individual commands, such as minimum and maximum lengths for arguments which is a great
capability against buffer overflow threats.
Furthermore, another useful feature of some of application firewalls is enforcing compliance
checking. Many products implement protocols in ways that match the specification. It is therefore
usually necessary to let such implementations communicate across the firewall.
Firewalls with both stateful inspection and stateful protocol analysis capabilities are not full-
fledged intrusion detection and prevention systems (IDPS). IDSPs offer more extensive attack detec-
tion and prevention capabilities, such as, signature-based and/or anomaly-based analysis to detect
[43].
2.5.4 Application-proxy gateways
It is a feature of advanced firewalls that combines lower-layer access control with upper-layer func-
tionality. The firewall reacts as a proxy and never allows a direct connection between two hosts that
wish to communicate. In fact, each successful connection results in the creation of two separate
connections (one between the client and the proxy server, another between the proxy server and
the true destination. The connection would seem transparent but the internal IP addresses are not
visible to the outside world.
In addition to the usual rule-set, some proxy agents are able to mandate authentication of each
individual network user, in the forms of user ID and password, hardware or software token, and
biometrics.
Although application-proxy gateways resemble to application firewalls and have the ability of
operating at the application and transport layer, they are quite different. First, the application-
proxy gateways offer higher level of security for some applications since it prevents direct connections
and inspects the traffic content. Second, application-proxy servers have the ability to decrypt
packets (e.g., SSL-protected payloads), examine them and re-encrypt them before sending them to
the destination.
Like any devices, firewalls with application-proxy gateways contain some disadvantages. Because
of the full packet awareness in some of the application-proxy gateways, they are poorly suited to
high-bandwidth or real-time applications. To reduce the load on the firewall, a dedicated proxy
server could be used to secure less time-sensitive services. Another disadvantage is the tendency of
application-proxy gateways to limit the terms of support for new network application and protocols
and simply allow unsupported traffic to tunnel through the firewall. Therefore, it is essential to
investigate the support of an application-proxy gateway for a specific protocol, before purchasing
it.
2.5.5 Dedicated Proxy Servers
They differ from application-proxy gateways and retain dedicated proxy control of traffic and lim-
ited firewalling capabilities. They are only mentioned here because of their close relationship to
application-proxy gateway firewalls. Many of them are application-specific and some perform anal-
ysis and validation of common application protocols such as HTTP. It should be noted that due
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to their limited firewalling capabilities, they are typically deployed behind traditional firewall plat-
forms.
2.5.6 Virtual Private Networking
A common requirement for the firewalls at the edge of a network is encrypting and decrypting
specific network traffic flows between the protected network and external networks. This is nearly
always involves Virtual Private Networks (VPN) [44], which use additional protocols to encrypt
traffic, authenticate users and check integrity.
VPNs are most often used to provide secure network communication across untrusted networks,
such as extending the protected network to a multi-site organization , and providing secure remote
access to the internal network across the Internet. According to NIST [39] two common choices for
secure VPNs are IPSec [45] and Secure Socket Layer (SSL) / Transport Layer Security (TLS)[46] and
the two common VPN architectures are gateway-to-gateway and host-to-gateway. VPNs generally
rely on authentication protocols, such as Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)
[47] and Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) [48]. The VPN functionality upon fire-
walls requires additional capacity planning and resources which many firewalls include hardware
acceleration for encryption to minimize the impact of VPN services.
2.5.7 Network Access Control
Another common feature for firewalls at the edge of a network is to perform client check for incoming
connections from remote users, commonly called Network Access Control (NAC) or Network Access
Protection (NAP). This feature allows for access based on the user’s credentials and performing
health check on the user’s computer. The health checking consists of verifying one or more of the
following items:
 Latest updates to anti-malware and firewall software
 Configuration settings for anti-malware and personal firewall software
 Elapsed time since the previous malware scan
 Patch level of the operation system and selected applications
 Security configuration of the operation system and selected applications
It should be noted that these health checks require a software on the user’s system that is
controlled by the firewall.
2.5.8 Unified Threat Management (UTM)
Many firewalls combine multiple features into a single system to set and maintain policy easier. A
typical Unified Threat Management (UTM) system has a firewall, malware detection and eradic-
tation, sensing and blocking of suspicious network probes (IDPS functionality) and etc. There are
positive and negative sides for such firewalls. It reduces the complexity but it should have all the
desired features for security objectives too. Moreover, another trade-off is performance, the system
handling multiple tasks. Some organizations might find UTM useful, while others would prefer to
have multiple firewalls at the same location in their network.
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2.5.9 Web Application Firewalls
One of the most prone components of a network is the HTTP protocol used in web servers that
has been exploited by attackers in many ways, such as placing malicious software on someones
computer who is browsing the web, or tricking identities to reveal their private information. Many
of these exploits could be detected by this type of firewalls which reside in front of the web server
(these firewalls are a relatively new technology).
2.5.10 Firewalls for Virtual Infrastructure
Considering virtual systems (a quite popular solution of having multiple virtual systems on one
real computer), most of them include virtualized networking. Virtualized networking permits the
multiple operating systems communicate as if they were on a standard Ethernet, even though there
is no actual networking hardware.
As a relatively new area of firewall technology, since network activities that passes directly
between virtualized operation systems within a host cannot be monitored by an external firewall,
some virtualization systems offer built-in firewalls or permit third-party software firewalls to be
added as plug-ins.
2.5.11 Topology options of Firewalls
Convery [17] suggests five firewall placement options which move from less to more secure solutions:
 Basic filtering router: this implementation is easy to implement and does not impact sur-
rounding network. The drawbacks of this topology are the existence of public servers on the
internal side of router and enabling attacking internal systems, a single point of access control
failure, and lack of stateful filtering.
 Classic dual-router demilitarized zone (DMZ): The separation of public servers from the in-
ternal network and reducing the chance of attacks against internal network, in case of having
a compromised public server, are the main benefits of this design. But absence of stateful
inspection endangers the internal systems to attacks.
 Stateful firewall DMZ design: This design is an improvement upon the classic dual-router
DMZ and suits the situations which the performance capability of the existing firewall cannot
match the throughput requirements of the public servers.
 Modern three-interface firewall design: This design, according to Convery [17], is a gold stan-
dard in firewall edge deployment which is the best balance of security, cost, and management.
The most important benefit of such design is requiring all traffic flow to pass through the
firewall, including traffic from the internet to the public servers, which in all previous designs
were only protected by basic ACLs. This design could be modified by adding more segments
allowing public servers to be separated from one another.
 Multifirewall design: A number of variation of this design exist. But it is, primarily, used for
e-commerce or any other sensitive transactions which generally require multiple trust levels.
An illustration of each placement (topology) is presented in figure 2.4, 2.5, 2.6, 2.7, and 2.8, adapted
from [17].
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Figure 2.4: Basic filtering router topology
Figure 2.5: Classic dual-router demilitarized zone (DMZ)
topology
Figure 2.6: Stateful firewall DMZ topology
Figure 2.7: Three interface firewall topology
Figure 2.8: Modern firewall topology
2.6 Intrusion Detection Prevention Systems
As NIST mentions [43],
”Intrusion detection is the process of monitoring the events occurring in a computer sys-
tem or network and analyzing them for signs of possible incidents, which are violations
or imminent threats of violation of computer security policies, acceptable use policies,
or standard security practices. Intrusion prevention is the process of performing intru-
sion detection and attempting to stop detected possible incidents. Intrusion detection
and prevention systems (IDPS) are primarily focused on identifying possible incidents,
logging information about them, attempting to stop them, and reporting them to se-
curity administrators. In addition, organizations use IDPSs for other purposes, such as
identifying problems with security policies, documenting existing threats, and deterring
23
individuals from violating security policies. IDPSs have become a necessary addition to
the security infrastructure of nearly every organization.”
There a number of types of IDPS technologies differing, primarily, based on the types of events
they are able to recognize and the methodologies they use to identify possible incidents. Four types
of IDPS technologies which are also mentioned in NIST Guideline [43] are as follows:
 Network-Based: It monitors network traffic for particular network segments or devices and
analyzes the network and application protocol activity.
 Wireless: as the name implies, this type of technology monitors and analyzes wireless network
traffic and protocols.
 Network Behavior Analysis (NBA): Examining network network traffic and identifying threats
generating unusual traffic flows, such as DDoS attacks and scanning is the functionality of
this type of technology
 Host-based: it is commonly deployed on critical hosts such as publicly accessible servers and
servers containing sensitive information. This technology monitors the characteristics and
events of a single host.
Their typical components are:
 Sensor or agent: Monitoring and analyzing activities are done by them. The term sensor
refers to network-based, wireless, and NBA technologies. The term agent refers to host-based
IDPS technologies.
 Management Server: It is a centralized device receiving information from the sensors or agents
and manages them (some types of IDPS sensors and agents could be deployed standalone, and
managed and monitored directly by administrators). Management server perform analysis on
the event information that sensors or agents provide and identify events that individual sensors
or agents are not able to. Matching event information from different sensors and agents, which
is known as correlation. Appliances and software-only products of management servers are
available. Zero, one, and multiple management servers could exist based on different use-cases.
 Database Server: It is a repository for the recorded event information by sensors, agents, and
management servers, which is supported by many IDPSs.
 Console: It is a program that provides an interface for the IDPS’s users and administrators,
that is, typically, installed onto standard desktop or laptop computers. IDPS administration
- such as configuring sensors or agents, and applying software updates - and IDPS monitor-
ing/analysis could be done using separated or integrated consoles.
It should be noted that the IDPS components could have two network architectures: using the
organizations’ standard networks or a separate network strictly designed for security software man-
agement, known as a management network. In management networks, each sensor or agent contains
an additional network interface known as management interface that connects to the management
network. In case a management network is not deployed, a virtual management network using a
virtual local area network (VLAN) [49] withing the standard networks is recommended by NIST
[43].
Generally, most IDPS provide information gathering, logging, detection and prevention security
capabilities.
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2.7 Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting
Authentication, Authorization, and Auditing (AAA) essentially defines a framework for coordi-
nating discipline across multiple network technologies and platforms. In practice, an AAA Server
with a database of user profiles and configuration data communicates with AAA clients residing
on network components, such as Network-Attached Storage (NAS) and router, provide distributed
Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting services [50].
As it is mentioned in section 2.10, authentication involves validating the end users’ identity prior
to permitting them network access, authorization defines what rights and services an authenticated
user is allowed, and accounting provides the methodology for collecting information about the end
users’ resource consumption, used for billing, auditing, and capacity planning. One or more AAA
server serves a central repository for storing and distributing AAA information.
2.8 Network Management
Hagering [51] defines network management as all measures ensuring the effective and efficient op-
eration of a system within its resources in accordance with corporate goals. Boutaba and Xiao [52]
state the objectives of network management as follows:
 Managing network resources and services: including the control, monitor, update, and report
of network states, device configuration, and network services
 Simplify network management complexity: extrapolating network management information
into human manageable form and interpreting high-level management objectives.
 Reliable services: providing network high quality of service, minimizing downtime, detecting
and fixing network faults and errors, and safeguard against security threats.
 Cost conscious: keeping track of network resources and users. All network resources and
service usages are to be kept track of and reported.
A more general categorization of network management functions is provided by OSI reference
model [51, p.82-94]. The OSI model breaks network management functions into five functional
areas:
 Fault Management: detection, recovery, and documentation of network anomalies and failures
 Configuration Management: recording and maintaining network configuration, and updating
configuration parameters to ensure normal network operations
 Accounting Management: user management, user administration, and billing on usage of
network resources and services.
 Performance Management: providing reliable and high quality network performance, including
quality of service
 Security Management: providing protection against security threats to network resources,
services, and data, in addition to ensuring user privacy and access rights.
It should be noted that in the recent years many other features have been added to the network
management servers but the mentioned features are the basis of majority of them.
25
2.9 Time synchronization
The Network Time Protocol (NTP) [53] is one of the oldest protocols on the Internet and has been
widely used since its initial publication. NTP is widely used to synchronize computer clocks to
some time reference. The client software continuously runs a background task that periodically gets
updates from one or more servers. The client software ignores responses from servers that appear
to be sending the wrong time, and averages the results from those that appear to be correct.
Many of the available NTP software clients, for personal computers, do not average at all.
Instead, they send a single timing request to a signal server and then use this information to
set their computer’s clock, called Simple Network Time Protocol (SNTP) [54]. The best current
practices has been published as RFC 8633 [55].
2.10 Security threats
Generally, apart from any type of system, security is preservation of the following concepts [20]:
 Confidentiality: to maintain the security of user’s personal data in the CPS and prevent
an attacker from attempting change of the state of the physical system by ”eavesdropping”
communication channel between the sensors and the controller, and between the controller
and actuator.
 Integrity: to maintain the data or resources unchanged without permission.
 Availability: to prevent any failure in computer technology, management, communication
and equipment
 Authenticity: to identify a subject or resource as it claims.
 Accountability: to trace the actions of an entity uniquely to the entity
 Non-repudiation: to prove nonexistence of any replication of actions or events.
 Reliability: to confirm that both parties involved are really ones they pretend to be
There could be some confusion about the difference between reliability and authenticity. Reliability
means that the entity is capable of standing for the facts to which it attests, while authenticity
means that a record is what it claims to be.
Cyber-physical threats are threats that originate in cyberspace but have an impact on physical
space of the system. In other words, they emerge from cyberspace and affect the physical space
[20].
Based on [20] work which is owed to [56], a tree of attacks and threats based on the functional
model of CPS is proposed, figure 2.9. The branches of the tree include the following types of attack:
(a) Attacks on sensor devices (Sensing)
(b) Attacks on actuators (Actuation)
(c) Attacks on computing components (Computing)
(d) Attacks on communications (Communications)
(e) Attacks on feedback (Feedback)
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Figure 2.9: A tree diagram of attacks and threats on cyber-physical systems, adapted from [20]
It should be noted that threats are not necessary external and deliberate. Threats may be
deliberate, accidental or environmental.
Meanwhile, attacks in the published literature can be roughly divided into three categories too
[18]:
 Denial of Service(DoS): which mostly aims to disrupt the availability principle of security.
 Replay attacks: a replay attack is a natural strategy, in which a valid data transmission is
maliciously or fraudulently repeated or delayed.
 Deception attacks: in which the data integrity is modified for transmitted packets among
different cyber-parts. In different scenarios, it could also be called as false data-injection
attacks, malicious attacks, to just name a few.
ENISA have evaluated the criticality of each assets of Industry 4.0, figure 1.3, by interviewing
experts. It involved a structured questionnaire and resulted in a figure correspond to the percentage
of experts who selected a given option, figure 2.10. The figure indicates that stake holders consider
ICS, i.e. Programmable Logic Controller (PLCs), Remote Terminal Unit (RTUs), Distributed
Control Systems (DCS), Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA), and in our case
OPC UA systems, to be the most critical assets for Smart Manufacturing and Industry 4.0.
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Figure 2.10: Asset criticality [7]
2.10.1 Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol attacks
Since the current system is benefiting from the ease of using Dynamic Host Configuration Protocols
(DHCP) server [57] in the network, it is noteworthy to mention different attacks and threats which
could a DHCP server suffers from.
The number of IP-based network nodes is continuously, such as mobile devices, IP telephony,
sensors and IoT devices. These newly connected devices must have a correctly configured Internet
Protocol (IP) settings, to be able to communicate over a data network. Configuring all these options
manually, would require considerable amount of time and labor. Therefore, usually, these devices
receive such settings automatically, requesting from a DHCP Server.
DHCP was developed from Bootstrap protocl (BOOTP) for dynamically assigning binding in-
formation, which includes an IP address and other related network configuration, such as subnet
mask and default gateway, to any node on the network. DHCP service uses a User Datagram
Protocol (UDP) [58]. It utilizes UDP port number 67 for DHCP server originated traffic and port
68 for client originated traffic, mentioned in the related RFC [57]. The main fields and the process
could be found in the RFC[57] and Aldaoud’s article [59]. Grasping the functionality and the packet
structure of DHCP matters, but since it is not in line with the purpose of the project, the more
important part of the concept and DHCP attacks are focused on, i.e. DHCP attacks.
DHCP is considered a vulnerable and insecure service since the protocol does not mandate
authentication from the DHCP clients and it could be attacked in various ways, according to
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Aladoud [59]. Apart from exploiting DHCP configuration to provide incorrect settings for the
DHCP clients or exploiting bugs to crash the service, there are three more popular attacks which
put the server in danger [60]. As Bhaiji [60] provides some details, the attacks in addition to a brief
description of them are as follows:
 DHCP flood attack: It occurs when the attacker, continuously sends forged DHCP client mes-
sages to the DHCP service. It is done in order to downgrade the performance and capabilities
which, normally, is due to the extra amount of incoming packers. This type of attacks may
lease or reserve pool’s available IP addresses [61].
 DHCP starvation attack: it is a specific kind of flood attack where an attacker continuously
sends forged DHCP client messages in order to exhaust the available IP addresses of the
server’s pool. This will cause the legitimate DHCP clients to lease their IP addresses and lose
their connection.
 DHCP spoofing attack: which is done by introducing a DHCP Rouge server, also known as
spurious DHCP server. This will lead to a race condition in replying to client DHCP messages
and the DHCP client will use the first arrived message to configure its binding information. In
other words, the DHCP rouge server creates a man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack [62] (details
regarding the MITM attack could be found in Mallik’s article [63].
Aldaoud has also investigated different DHCP attacking tools and two relevant packet crafting
libraries, which is noted in the related article [59].
2.11 The existing Cyber-Physical System at UiT campus Narvik
Cooperation among manufacturing systems could be named as one of the visions behind industry
4.0 which focuses on smart manufacturing facilities. Department of Industrial Engineering (DIE),
which operates a robotic laboratory, encompasses a Cyber-Physical System (CPS) setup as shown in
figure 2.11. This department has discussed the use of OPC Unified Architecture (OPC UA) standard
for communication between hardware and software components in a typical manufacturing system
and developed a digital twin which presents a demonstration of the digital laboratory [38] [64].
The OPC UA 9 server, shown in figure 2.11, is running the server version of OPC UA and all
the first-layer components are running client version of OPC UA. Running a OPC UA client on
any workstation being involved in the network and adding the server and other components based
on their URL, would enable controlling the components and administrating the system.
In a bigger picture, considering the mentioned three essential stages of Industry 4.0 (section
2.10.1), in our case, the first step is done by integrating Systems on a Chip (SoC), like Raspberry
Pi, and the functionality of OPC UA clients. All the OPC UA clients are connected to the OPC
UA server. The second step, which is related to analyzing data, is handled by an OPC UA server.
A commanding system using OPC UA and simulation of the existing components using Visual




Figure 2.11: The existing system of Industrial engineering department
Figure 2.12: The Visual Components model of the laboratory
New functionality and features, such as Machine Learning for the robot arms, are being devel-
oped and added upon the system in a fast pace. Nevertheless, the main objective of this system is to
bring all components with different brands, rather new or old, together and build a command center
that also simulates the laboratory using Visual Components software, figure 2.12. The ultimate
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objective of the laboratory is to provide such a system for the industry.
3 Method
This section states the methodology for answering the research questions (section 1.1). Emphasizing
on the first question as the most important part of this thesis, a method is selected to institute a
secure architecture for the purpose of the department of industrial engineering. The architecture
would be the ground for answering the second and third question.
As it was mentioned in the prior section (section 2.1), there are a number of frameworks and
approaches to evaluate and consider security for a system, such as NIST [29], Security classifica-
tion [27], and Multi-metric approach [28]. Although NIST Framework is one of the most popular
approaches toward security, not having different examples and use-cases, which NIST Framework
has been applied on, found, resulted in looking for an approach that has a more clarified concept.
Investigating the security approach of Cisco Systems11, as one of the leading companies in
manufacturing and selling networking hardware, software, telecommunications equipment and other
high-technology services and products, is a valid choice. Cisco has already been first in introducing
new proprietary protocols that were improved and standardized later, like NetFlow [65], Enhanced
Interior Gateway Protocol (EIGRP) [66] and etc. Moreover, during a talk with a security expert,
Cisco, i.e. Cisco SAFE, was suggested.
After reading through different materials that Cisco has published, Cisco’s approach and the
vision of visibility for security have piqued my interest. Moreover, different use-cases, detailed
explanations and clear road maps are introduced inside the documentations. These clarifications
are a great help for a non-expert to grasp the concept. Therefore, Cisco’s approach, referred to
as Cisco SAFE, is the method chosen for approaching security (i.e. Cisco SAFE for IoT Threat
Defense for Manufacturing [1] and Cisco SAFE secure Campus [2]).
Cisco SAFE is a quiet ripe and mature concept. The first blueprints[17] found about Cisco
SAFE, return to 2004. Convery’s book[17] is named as the main force behind the original SAFE
Blueprints, from concept to consolidating considerations, to builds outs to authoring the first pivotal
white papers that Cisco posted. The official revised reference guide [67] was published in 2010.
SAFE is a security model and method used to secure business [11]. It provides the design and
implementation guidelines for building secure and reliable network infrastructures that are resilient
to both well-known and new forms of attacks. It takes a defense-in-depth approach, where multiple
layers of protection are strategically located throughout the network, but under a unified strategy
[67, p. 1].
SAFE supplies an approach for IoT and manufacturing networks quiet different from Cloud
and classic computer networks. In Cloud and classic computer networks, SAFE proposes the key
to simplify cybersecurity into secure Places In the Network (PINs) for infrastructure, and Secure
Domains for operational guidance. While for Iot threat defense for manufacturing, it tackles the
challenge the threats pose to IoT, on four critical fonts. In the following two sections more details
regarding both concepts are expressed.
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Figure 3.1: Key to SAFE, the approach of SAFE for classic computer networks
3.1 Cisco SAFE for networks
SAFE simplifies network security by providing solution guidance using the Places In the Network
(PINs). PINs are locations that are commonly found in networks and conceptually represent the







Cisco has published articles for each PIN [2, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72] and the further information could
be found on the Cisco website12.
The Secure Domains represent the operational side of the key. Operational security is divided
by function and the people in the organization that are responsible for them. The domains are:





 Security Intelligence: provides global detection and aggregation of emerging malware and
threats.
 Compliance: addresses internal and external policies.
 Segmentation: establishes boundaries for data and users.
 Threat Defense: provides visibility into the most evasive and dangerous threats.
 Secure Services: provides technologies such as access control, virtual private networks, and
encryption
Figure 3.2 represents different capabilities regarding each secure domain.
It is noteworthy to attend to the Cisco SAFE approach for campus networks [2]. This approach
is integrated inside the Cisco SAFE for IoT threat defense for manufacturing, which is the main
approach of this thesis toward generating a secure architecture.
3.2 Cisco SAFE for IoT Threat Defense for Manufacturing
Cisco’s IoT threat defense solution takes an architectural approach to protect IoT using the SAFE
model for security. Cisco SAFE starts with the business flow/use cases. This design guide specifies
the components and configurations used to validate this architecture, protecting manufacturer as
they embark on their transformation journey to achieve Industry 4.0 or realize the Industrial IoT
(IIoT) [1]. Cisco SAFE for IoT Threat Defense for Manufacturing tackles the threats to IoT on
four critical fonts, which is presented in figure 3.3.
Figure 3.3: Four critical fronts of IoT threat defense for manufacturing, adapted from [1]
This approach suggests an architecture for IoT. International Society of Automation ISA-99
Committee for Manufacturing and Control System Security (IACS) bases itself on the Purdue
Model Hierarchy [73], a common well-known model in the manufacturing industry, and identifies
the levels and logical framework zones as the Plant Logical Framework, figure 3.4. Cisco adapts
IACS, adjusts it based on its own background, and proposes a more complicated architecture. As
it is mentioned in the documentation [1],
”The Purdue model and ISA-99 have identified levels of operations and key zones for










































Automation include a demilitarized zone (DMZ) between the enterprise and manufac-
turing zones as part of Converged Plantwide Ethernet (CPwE) architecture. Emerging
IACS security standards such as ISA-99, NIST 800-82, and Department of Homeland
Security INL/EXT-06-11478 also include a DMZ as part of a defense-in-depth strategy.
the purpose of the DMZ is to provide a buffer zone where data and services can be shared
between the enterprise and manufacturing zones. The DMZ is critical in maintaining
availability, addressing security vulnerabilities, and abiding by regulatory compliance
mandates (e.g., Sarbanes-Oxely). In addition, the DMZ allows for segmentation of
organizational control; for example, between the IT organization and manufacturing.
This segmentation allows different policies to be applied and contained. for example,
the manufacturing organization may apply security and quality-of-service (QoS) poli-
cies that are different from the IT organization. The DMZ is where the policies and
organizational control can be divided.”
The importance of a Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), as a buffer zone, in order to maintain availability
is a key point. Availability, is the most important principle of security for cyber-physical systems
[12]. Therefore, throughout the project, availability is considered as the most important principle
of security.
Figure 3.4: Plant Logical Framework, adapted from [1]
Using the SAFE Campus reference architecture [2] and IoT Threat Defense business flows, it
could easily be shown that how the end-to-end architecture, as shown in figure 3.5 (given example
by Cisco), could include both IT and OT models, and the deployment of the capabilities protecting
the flow. This example and the general plant logical framework were adopted for this project. The
proposed case of this project is presented in the proposed architecture section (section 4.1.4).
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Figure 3.5: CPwE reference architecture in SAFE Format with business flows, adapted from [1]
Details related to the mentioned four fonts of Cisco SAFE for treating the threats of IoT for
manufacturing is presented in the following four subsections.
3.2.1 Segmentation
Security starts with visibility [1]. But for the IoT systems, segmentation comes first. There are
varied techniques of attacking and gaining access to IoT devices [74]. Therefore, segmentation could
limit the effect of a potentially compromised device to a limited area of the network. In other words,
Segmentation is about:
 restricting network access
 diving the network based on role and function
Cisco suggests its Identity Services Engine (Cisco ISE) 13 plus TrustSec 14 for the purpose of
segmentation. The practical deployment of Cisco ISE is provided by Richer and Wood [75].
3.2.2 Visibility and Analysis
After applying segmentation for devices and users, visibility and analytic enables identification of




that bypass existing controls is done with ease. Cisco ISE, Stealthwatch 15, Firepower 16 and
Umbrella 17 are the advised technologies from Cisco to provide visibility and analysis.
3.2.3 Remote Access
Secure remote access replaces the legacy modems and other connectivity methods vendors used in
the past, eliminating the back doors to a digitally connected network. The security capabilities
related to this font enable and ensure secure remote connectivity to the system. Identity capability
(AAA server), VPNs, and Anti-malwares for the client devices are the capabilities regarding having
a secure remote access.
Cisco ISE, AnyConnect VPN 18, and Advanced Malware Protection (AMP) 19 are proposed by
Cisco for this purpose.
3.2.4 Services
The former fonts and the related capabilities help to create a secure network. And as it was men-
tioned earlier, a secure network is the foundation for a secure system. Services such as security
network penetration assessment, and automation & control system risk assessment could help un-
derstanding the facts of the situation. Services which Cisco provides for IoT could be found on
their website 20.
3.3 Security Life-cycle
Security is a system (section 2.4). The security threats evolve; hackers will continue to evolve new
and sophisticated methods to get around even the tightest security [76]. Therefore, as the threats
evolve, the security system should also develop. The new standards, guidelines, risk assessments,
best practices, and the feedback from the existing security system should be utilized to improve the
system. Moreover, business needs could alter over time. Absence of a procedure in which all the
new concepts and necessary changes are applied, would result in a fragile system.
After establishing the system according to the Cisco SAFE method, the security life-cycle, pre-
sented in figure 3.6, is selected to improve the security system over the time. This life-cycle, considers
business needs, guidelines, standards, risk analysis, industry best practices, and the feedback from
the current security operations, to enhance a security system. Therefore, if there are some other
materials, such as new risks and best practices, the security system could be improved based on
this life-cycle. The security life-cycle is adapted from the blueprint of Cisco SAFE, Convery’s book
[17].
3.4 Vulnerability detection
Intrusion Detection Prevention Systems could be used to document the existing threats in the
system, although it is not their main purpose of existence inside a network (stated in section 2.6).








Figure 3.6: Security Life Cycle Overview adapted from [17]
assist administrators to detect the vulnerabilities of networks and receive recommendations for the
remediation.
There are a number of vulnerability assessment tools for networks and cyber-physical systems.
In order to choose one, several benchmarks exist to provide a number of best choices, such as G2
which uses user satisfaction in order to rate the softwares 21. McMahon [77] has also benchmarked
vulnerability assessment tools for enhanced CPS resiliency. He provides knowledge on how to
improve the resiliency by evaluating and comparing the accuracy, and scalability of two popular
vulnerability assessment tools, Nessus and OpenVAS.
After investigating different vulnerability scanner tools (Nessus, OpenVAS and Zenmap) Nessus
has been selected for this project. Nessus is one the most popular tools, user-friendly, powerful,
and easy-to-use. Nonetheless, OpenVAS and Zenmap (A graphical front end for Nmap) are handy
and open-source which form them as valid alternatives.
21https://www.g2.com/categories/vulnerability-scanner
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Subsection Number Title The answering question
4.1 Secure Architecture Research Question 1
4.2 Current State Research Question 2
4.3 Protective Measures Research Question 3
Table 3: Relativity of subsection with the research questions
3.5 Evaluation of the current CPS
In order to evaluate the current system, in its current state, the architecture of the system has
been assessed. Cyber-Physical Systems same as a normal computer network, enables the existing
networking infrastructure concepts to establish a network architecture. Therefore, Cisco routing
and switching materials [14, 15, 16, 78], which are related to the background of the author, in
addition to Cisco SAFE for IoT [1] were used to assess the system.
The idea for the method of assessment is to propose a secure architecture for the system firstly
and compare the current architecture of the system with it. There are a number of factors con-
structing a secure architecture. Considering all the distinct factors separately and evaluating the
existing CPS with each factor individually, would be a tiresome and complex procedure. Therefore,
all the factors were firstly utilized to yield a complete secure architecture that satisfies the need of
the department of industrial engineering. Following that, the existing system is compared to the
proposed touchstone. The touchstone is the answer to the first research question (section 1.1).
4 Results
In this section, the effort for answering the three main questions of this research (section 1.1) eis
respectively mentioned. Section 4.1 pertains to introducing a secure architecture for the project
proprietor (the department of industrial engineering at UiT campus Narvik). Section 4.2, as an
answer to the second question of this research, investigates the current state of the CPS and discusses
the related shortcomings. Ultimately, section 4.3 covers the security measures that should be done,
or are already done, to enhance the security level of the system. Table 3 supplies an overview of
the relation of each following sections to the research questions (the research questions are already
mentioned in section 1.1.)
4.1 Secure Architecture
As Neuman [79] mentions, security experts (and the victims of cyber-attacks) calling for designing
applications for security rather than adding it later. This call is often misunderstood, or perhaps it
is misstated. What does it mean to design an application for security? To many it means including
security requirements during design, so that necessary data and interfaces up form the application
to use myriad security mechanism such as encryption, authentication, etc. As he believes, it,
unfortunately, misses the point. ”Yes, Providing the ability to use such mechanisms is important;
but, true security requires an even more fundamental integration of security in a way that permeate
the basic design and structure of application itself.” [79]. The security level of a system is as strong
as the weakest security point of your system. In other words, no matter how secure the majority
of a network is, if there is a small part which is vulnerable, the whole network is vulnerable.
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In order to answer the first question of this research about defining a secure CPS for the purpose
of the existing system in the depart of industrial engineering (Research Question 1 in section 1.1),
Cisco CAFE IoT threat defense for manufacturing approach [1] was mainly utilized. Moreover,
an study of the OPC UA security enabled a better perception of the existing system and aided
proposing a better architecture, section 4.1.3.
4.1.1 Business Flow
Cisco SAFE [11] uses business flow as a basis and contemplates it for applying security capabilities.
Moreover, the visibility of the users and how they use the system, provides clarity inside the network
which assists any developer to have a better perspective of the system.
According to the department of industrial engineering, currently, there are only three characters
(identities) defined to use the system:
 Engineer: who has the full access to all devices (including the OPC UA clients and servers
and other components).
 CEO and clients of the CPS products: who has only a limited access to the reporting device
that reports the current status of the CPS.
 Third-parties: who tend to access specific devices for maintenance purposes.
Apart from automatic and periodic activities, such as Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) [80]
requests, which is done independent from real identities, fetching updates and information from
servers and repositories is independent from any engineer seeking them and they should be sched-
uled. The security analysis of Kaspersky Lab [81] regarding OPC UA implies the necessity of
keeping the system updated too. Therefore, devices were considered inside the defined business
flow as separate entities.
A more exact illustration of the business flow is presented in figure 4.1. The effort is to provide
an overview of the flow and emphasize the most important features which identities would use
the system for. Therefore, the details about the exact servers and devices as the destination of
the users has been generalized (i.e., devices and how they fetch services and updates from the
servers). Therefore, this figure provides an overview of the business flow rather than a detailed
one. Visualizing the precise business flow of a system, requires an analytic system registering flows,
which the network lacks at the current state.
4.1.2 Business Flow and Security Capabilities
Cisco SAFE for IoT Threat Defense for Manufacturing [1] provides an example of business flows
and the related security capabilities. The security capabilities are categorized based on the four
critical fonts that tackles the challenges pose to IoT (Segmentation, Visibility and analysis, Remote
access, and Services), figure 4.2.
If the business flow of this project, figure 4.1, is contemplated, security capabilities which fit the
flow should be proposed. Based on the example that Cisco provides, figure 4.2, the business flow
and related capabilities are presented in figure 4.3. In the background section (section 2.5-2.9) a
brief description of each capability is supplied.
The first layer of a good defense-in-depth strategy is appropriate access control strategies [82].
For the segmentation feature, mentioned in section 3.2.1, the identity security capability (using a
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Figure 4.1: Business flow defined based on the need of the department of industrial engineering
AAA server) and firewalling, limiting network traffics based on set of rules, have been proposed.
It should be noted that the segments in the network architecture also is a part of segmentation
feature which is not shown in the figure 4.3.
The visibility and analytic feature is done by using IDPS, network analytic and threat intel-
ligence systems. These named feature could all be integrated into one component but since the
functionality, in this case, matters the most, they were named as separate entities. The ideal sit-
uation for the research purposes, is considering a threat intelligence system independent from any
other components. The independent component would enable a deep investigation of the flow and
traffic of the network, and defining the norms inside the network.
Virtual Private Network (VPN) access and the fact of using an anti-malware software on the
connecting client device would respect the feature of remote access of Cisco SAFE for IoT.
It should be noted that the mentioned capabilities are not dedicated to only one of the four
fonts. But in order to clarify the main purpose of each of them, they are mentioned in only one of
the fonts. For every mentioned capability, Cisco provides a Cisco-proprietary technology (noted in
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Figure 4.2: Example of SAFE Business Flows and Capabilities, adapted from [1]
section 3.2). Most of the proposed technologies are costly and well-performed using Cisco devices
(Switch, Router, Access point, and etc.). Since the objective of the department is to have the
lowest possible expense for the project, the technologies should be replaced by the open-source
alternatives. The open-source alternatives for the mentioned capabilities are discussed in section
4.3.
4.1.3 OPC UA security study
Section 2.10 denoted the ICS (in our case OPC UA) as the most critical component of Cyber-
Physical Systems. In this section, a security study of OPC UA is discussed. The study would help
perceiving the system and the main service of the CPS better and affect the proposing architecture.
OPC Foundation has published an article by the title of ”Practical Security recommendations
for building OPC UA application” [32]. The article is the most recent publication of the company
in the field of security, until March 2021. Within the article, the following points were outstanding.
The OPC Foundation claims OPC UA as a system which in contrast to many other industrial
protocols, provides a high level of security. This claim is backed up by the analysis of the Federal
Office for information security (BSI). BSI is the first and foremost the central IT security service
provider and national cyber security authority for the federal government in Germany. Moreover,
the company tries to introduce a security model for the concept and some best practices which
were described for two different use cases, one for a low level of implementation of OPC UA inside
a network ,and another one for a higher contribution of OPC UA inside a network (the second use
case is a more similar system to our existing system). The proposed security architecture considers:
 Trusted Information (CIA triad)
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Figure 4.3: The business flow and the required security capabilities, which are categorized based on the four fonts of
overcoming threats
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– confidentiality in transport layer,
– integrity in transport layer
– availability by restricting the message size and returning no security related codes,
 Access Control (AAA Framework)
– Authentication by username and password or X.509 certificate on the application layer
– Authorization by access rights of the users or the user’s role
– Accountability by generating audit events for security related operations
Moreover, the security aspect of OPC UA uses defense/security in depth, certificate management,
and storage of private keys are the two key points that are discussed within the publication.
Most importantly, OPC Foundation is not considering the following concepts and refers them
to Information Security Management System (ISMS) that the ISO 27001 defines:
 Security training of personnel
 Security life cycles
 Security Policies
 Handling physical access
Because of the popularity of OPC UA in the industry and being a member of the OPC Foun-
dation consortium, Kaspersky Lab has also analyzed the security of OPC UA [81]. Despite the
seventeen zero-day vulnerabilities in the OPC Foundation’s products and several vulnerabilities in
the commercial applications that use these products, Kaspersky Lab has identified a number of
insecure data structures and lack of documentation. The poor documentation makes errors more
likely to be introduced in the process of using and modifying OPC UA. The reported vulnerabilities
were reviewed and fixed by OPC Foundation, the formal response of OPC Foundation is accessible
on the Kaspersky website 22. Nevertheless, being prone to errors (i.e., stack overflow) and the
necessity of keeping the system up-to-date is concluded from the study.
4.1.4 Proposed Architecture
OPC Foundation [33] and Cisco SAFE [1] have emphasized on the concept of defense/security
in depth. As McGuiness mentions [83], defense in depth is the concept of protecting a computer
network with a series of defensive mechanisms such that if one mechanism fails, another will already
be in place to thwart an attack. The strategy considers the fact of variety of attack methods and
absence of a single method to protect a network from all the variations of attacks.
As many articles, such as [84], broach defense in depth at each layer of the TCP/IP protocol
suite, it is essential to consider the security from the lowest layer. Moreover, if security of the lower
layers of the protocol suite is not taken into consideration, the higher layer security approaches are
precarious. In other words, if the concept of security is not applied on first layer of TCP/IP (Network
interface layer), the security of the third layer (Network layer) is not in its highest effectiveness.
NIST in one of its Guidelines related to IPsec VPNs [85] mentions:
22https://ics-cert.kaspersky.com/reports/2018/05/10/opc-ua-security-analysis/
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”Data is passed from the highest to the lowest layer, with each layer adding more
information. Because of this, a security control at a higher layer cannot provide full
protection for lower layers, because the lower layers perform functions of which the
higher layers are not aware”.
Therefore, importance of security in all layers and starting form the lowest layer is an acceptable
concept.
The proposed architecture is based on Cisco SAFE approach, discussed in section 3.2. It is
presented in figure 3.5. In general, four different zones are assumed, Enterprise Zone, Industrial
Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), Manufacturing Zone which includes Cell/Area Zone. Every traffic is
either generated or terminated in the DMZ. Since functionality of some servers differs from others,
segmenting the Industrial Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) into two different subnets (Infrastructure
servers and directly accessed servers) is considered. Elements of each zone are explained as follows:
 Cell/Area Zone:
The Cell/Area zone contains the robots (KUKA, MiR100, ...) that are connected to the
network through two access points. In order to increase the availability of the robots, two
access points are assumed. In case one of the access points encounters failures, the other one
would compensate for the loss of the other, until the faulty device is up and running again.
This functionality requires a third entity that controls the status of the two access points.
 Manufacturing Zone:
In the Manufacturing zone which contains the Cell/Area zone, a wireless Local Area Network
(LAN) controller, as its main functionality, handles the redundancy of the access points and
detects rogue access points 23. The OPC UA server is placed apart from the Cell/Area zone
to be available apart from other robots. In other words, disconnection in the Cell/Area zone
would not effect the OPC UA server. A switch connects all the mentioned elements together
and to the DMZ.
 DMZ 1: The first DMZ, tagged as Infrastructure servers in figure 4.4, contains all the
mentioned security capabilities mentioned in section 4.1.2. The servers are all brought together
and connected to the other zone through a switch.
 DMZ 2:
The second DMZ, tagged as Directly accessed servers in figure 4.4, contains the proxy/VPN
server that handles remote accesses, and the reporting server that aims to present general
information regarding the system and its products, mentioned in figure 4.1 and figure 4.3.
The reporting device (a web server) has not been implemented by the project owners yet, but
according to the need of the project owners this element is mentioned. As it is mentioned in
the network architecture book by Cisco press [17], proxy server functionality could be merged
with stateful firewall functionality, although separating the two functions generally provides
superior security, greater flexibility, and less-complex configurations (mentioned in section
2.5.)
23A rogue access point (RAP) is a wireless access point that has either been installed on a secure company network
without explicit authorization from a local network management or has been created to allow a cracker to conduct
a man-in-the-middle attack [86]
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Network Address Usable Host Range Broadcast Address Subnet Mask Usable Hosts
192.168.1.0 192.168.1.1-14 192.168.1.15 255.255.255.240 14
Table 4: Example of a /28 IP subnet
The reason for segmenting this zone from the former zone is the different functionality the
components own. None of the components in DMZ 1 is accessed directly through the Internet,
while all the components in DMZ 2 are accessed from the Internet. Nevertheless, the servers
in DMZ 1 need to be connected to DMZ 2 to fetch the necessary data for their functionality.
Same as all the former zones, a switch handles the connectivity in this zone.
 Enterprise Zone: This zone connects the network to the Internet or the other possible
networks. A stateless firewall could enable a basic packet filtering and bring another layer of
defense, while the other firewall performs a deeper packet inspection.
Each subnet should be assigned based on the maximum number of possible clients in that
subnet. For example, if the maximum number of clients in the manufacturing zone is assumed to
be 10, the IP subnet should have a chunk of 14 assignable IP addresses available. The presented
IP addresses in figure 4.4 are only examples . Table 4 provides an example of such IP subnet.
The communication of different subnets is enabled using routers and firewalls (firewalling is often
combined with routing, mentioned in section 2.5).
4.2 Current state
The current cyber-physical system functions as the users expect it. Nonetheless, the presented
figures (section 2.11) suffers from the lack of documentation of the exact topology of the system.
The topology would assist anyone who is interested in the exact functionality of the system, to
grasp it better. Therefore, firstly, an investigation of the network topology of the system has been
executed. Figure 4.5 indicates the components of the system in which an ASUS wireless router
carries the connectivity of the components to each other and to the Internet.
The existing system is designed based on functionality, neither efficiency nor security. The mea-
surements for the designing phase has only aimed functionality of the system. In other words, only
the services, functionality of OPC UA, and capabilities that enable connectivity of the components
is taken into consideration.
The previously described approach toward evaluation of the system, section 3.5, indicates the
need for a robust network architecture for further security analysis of the system. Considering
the proposed secure architecture (section 4.1.4), and the fundamentals of computer networks, the
following notable problems for the existing system are as follows:
 Lack of a Demilitarized Zone
 The single point of failure
 Uncertainty in the identities using the system
 Uncertainty about the IP address of critical components (IP Planning)








































Figure 4.5: Topology of the system
 Absence of any security capabilities
In the following section the details regarding the difficulties of the existing system are delivered.
4.2.1 Shortcomings of the current design
Considering the reviewed materials (NIST Guidelines, such as 800-82, Cisco SAFE, and computer
networking fundamentals, and comparing the proposed architecture with the existing architecture,
would assist pinpointing the shortcoming of the current design. This section would provide the
details regarding the most important detected flows of the existing design of the the robotic labo-
ratory.
The shortcomings are as follows:
 Absence of Demilitarized Zone
NIST 800-82, Cisco SAFE [1], and SANS [13] emphasize on restricting logical access to the
local network and network activity by using a demilitarized zone (DMZ). This zone will force
all the network traffics to either generate or terminate in this zone. Therefore, absence on
such critical zone in the network would endanger the system.
 Single Point of Failure
Cisco in its networking design materials (CCNP Routing and Switching [15, p.13]) mentions
the importance of redundancy and resilience for high availability. Previously mentioned im-
portance of availability in CPS (NIST 800-82 [12]), and the Cisco’s emphasize on redundancy,
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would criticize the usage of one device as the communication hub (ASUS wireless router,
presented in figure 4.5). Santra [87] also mentions the problem of single point of failure 24 in
star topology, which is the current topology of the system (figure 4.5).
In case there is a failure in the ASUS device, all the communication between the components
are terminated. The proposed design (figure 4.4) offers a redundancy in the number of access
points of the network. In case the main access point faces failure, the other access point
would compensate for the absence of it, until the faulty access point functions properly. This
compensation requires a third component called wireless controller, or as Cisco mentions it
as Wireless LAN Controller (WLC), managing different access points.
Moreover, the device is functioning as three different components, access point, switch and
router. Although this integration of critical functionality in one device reduces the complexity
of the network, it would cause a single point of failure for all the three functionality. The
proposed design first of all divides the three functionality into three different devices, access
points for connecting the wireless components to the network, a switch for connecting the
wired/wireless components to each other and the firewall. The firewall would have the func-
tionality of a router contained. This design would make the system flexible and expandable
in case there is a need for a bigger area of wireless coverage or adding more components to
the network.
 IP planning
In the existing system a DHCP server, running on the ASUS device, assigns binding informa-
tion, mentioned in section 2.10.1. Although clients normally request their old IP addresses
when they ask the DHCP server for the binding information, there is uncertainty in being
assigned the same IP address all the time. Therefore, in the existing system the IP address of
all components could alter. This change of IP would bring uncertainty, problems with logging,
or loss of connection with the devices that are always accessed through a certain IP address.
 Time synchronization
Time synchronization in the existing state is handled automatically by the operation systems
with the global clock provided by the default options of the different operation systems. Lee
[88] notes the devastating consequences of attack on a global clock synchronization and be-
lieves synchronized clocks offer new mechanisms for improving security, primarily because of
key property that they enable coordination without communication. For example, with syn-
chronized clocks, the absence of a message conveys information. Moreover, many smart grid
testbeds, as an example of Cyber-Physical Systems, in local substation protection schemes use
the Simple Network Time Protocol (SNTP) to synchronize time in the network of intelligent
electronic devices [89].
It was observed during investigating the existing system that the time of the devices are not
synchronized. Some devices are behind/ahead of the correct global clock. Therefore, it is
favorable to have a point in the local network which all devices are synchronized with. That
point could be synchronized with the exact global clocks. As it was mentioned in section 2.9,
a very simple system of SNTP could be starting point for the components which would have
24A single point of failure (SPOF) is a system component which, upon failure, renders an entire system
unavailable or unreliable, adapter from https://docs.oracle.com/cd/E20295_01/html/821-1217/fjdch.html#:~:
text=A%20single%20point%20of%20failure,these%20SPOFs%20can%20be%20mitigated
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a local server to have their time synchronized with. This local time synchronization would
also enable accuracy for the logs generated by different devices and value them more. With
a synchronized time accurate scheduled time would also be facilitated.
 Lack of Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting
The current system does not differentiate between any of the identities using the system. For
example, all the connected devices or people are able to access the OPC UA server or any
other component. Moreover, there is no functionality for storing, managing, and supplying
events and configuration information. No information about who, how, and when the users
used the system is stored in the current system.
The proposed architecture, in the first place, considers the type of identities and how they
use the system, figure 4.1 - the figure regarding business flows. Afterwards, it establishes the
security capabilities based on the business flows. The proposed architecture with an Authen-
tication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) server, facilitates a better segmentation of
access to the system (respecting the different identities which were defined in section 4.1.1),
limiting the privileges of different users, and tracking the activities. Following that, visibility
of the people who are using the system is also enabled. All the remote accesses should also be
validated by the AAA server. The other security services, such as IDPS, would have access
to the gathered data by AAA server and the security services themselves are validated by the
server too.
 Unknown status of the devices
No status of the components, whether they are on or off, having a high CPU usage, and etc.,
is being collected or known in the present system. For example, if one of the SoCs (Raspberry
Pi), faces a problem or is turned off due to a high temperature of the CPU, no one would
notice it, unless the engineer is unable to remote access the system and checks the component
physically. A network management server would handle such performance.
 Absence of network traffic controlling
The existing network provides no control over the types of traffic that enter, exists, and lives
inside the system. Any types of traffic including the malicous one could enter the network and
no information regarding them would be provided inside the network. It was mentioned earlier
(section 2.5) that how firewalls with its different features enable a control over the network.
Therefore, absence of such critical concept inside the network is one of the shortcoming of the
existing system.
 Want of intrusion detection and prevention
Detecting abnormalities and possible incidents inside a system requires a dedicated security
capability. Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems (IDPS), mentioned in section 2.6,
are responsible for such concern. Thus, absence of such component would disable detecting
possible incidents.
 Third-parties remote access software
On February 8th 2021, an attacker attempted hacking of the city of Oldsmar’s water treatment
system in Florida, USA. The attacker tried to increase the levels of sodium hydroxide 25.
25https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-cyber-florida-idUSKBN2A82FV
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The hacker gained access to a control panel that was password protected accessible using
TeamViewer, a remote control software, according to local authorities.
In a Motherboard report 26, several well-known security experts criticized companies and
workers who often use TeamViewer for sensitive resources. In the article, according to Cynthia
Brumfield 27 TeamViewer has years of acknowledgment of being a fairly insecure application.
Carhat, also, describes her ideal as setting up a secure VPN to the organization’s internal
network, then a secured login with mandatory multi-factor authentication to an intermediate
host and another secure login inside the network that controls the critical infrastructure. Cisco
SAFE for IoT also considers ta local VPN server (AnyConnect) for enabling remote access.
NIST also provides some guidelines for remote access and Bring Your Own Device (BYOD)
Security [90] too.
In the present state of the laboratory, TeamViewer is used for accessing all the devices, rather
critical ones or normal ones. According to the mentioned notes, using TeamViewer is one of the
shortcomings of the system. Replace such functionality with a local VPN/Proxy server would
disable remote accessing through a third-part software and enable a more secure solution.
Alleviating the mentioned threats and shortcomings would approach the system to a more
secure one. The following section as a response to the third question of this research, mentioned in
section 1.1, would provide security measures and open-source alternatives for the proposed security
architecture, figure 4.3 and 4.4.
4.3 Protective Measures
In this section, firstly, the concept of IP planning and assigning IPs based on the requirements of
the system, as one of the mentioned shortcomings, are discussed. Following that, the experiment-
ed/suggested tools and services, and options for the open-source alternatives of Cisco proprietary
security capabilities (Cisco ISE, TrustSec, Stealthwatch, Umbrealla, Advanced Malware Protection
(AMP), cisco cyber Vision Assessment Services, and Anyconnect) are presented. The hardware
alternatives for the proposed design, figure 4.4, are not considered as a part of this project. The
discussed alternatives are the ones that were claimed to be commonly used in the industry, and
implemented without a lot of complexity.
Table 5 provides an overview of the following sections and how the proposed alternatives are
related to the four fonts of security proposed by Cisco SAFE [1] (Segmentation, Visibility and
Analysis, Remote Access, and Services). The provided options in the following sections are meant
to replace the Cisco-proprietary security capabilities, which are costly and mostly well-performed
alongside the Cisco products (switches, routers, ...).
4.3.1 IP Planning
Since the number of connected people to the network, varies and different people need to gain access
to the network, a DHCP has been already implemented inside the system. According to the need of







Subsection Number Alternatives for Purpose Cisco-proprietary Capability
4.3.2
AAA




































Table 5: Overview of considered security capabilities with their subsection number and the equal Cisco-proprietary options
of thirty available hosts was dedicated for the manufacturing zone. According to the predictions of
the maximum connected devices to each segment, the IP planning and creating different subnets
have been done for the entire network and examples of them have been presented in figure 4.4 (due
to security reasons the exact IP addresses are not provided in the figure.)
DHCP reservation - assigning specific IP addresses to specific MAC addresses, for the sensitive
components, such as the OPC UA server and Kuka Controller, that are know for the components
based on their IP addresses, is also applied. This would assist the consistency and availability
of the network and those IP addresses would never be offered by the DHCP server to any other
client, except the defined ones. DHCP reservation, alleviates the consequences of DHCP flood and
starvation attack, mentioned in section 2.10.1 (the spoofing attacks are treated by a wireless LAN
controller, discussed in section 4.1.4.)
4.3.2 Alternatives for AAA Server
The OPC Foundation and CISCO SAFE emphasize on the fact of Authentication, Authorization,
and Accounting. Instead of Using Cisco ISE as one of the most expensive products in the mar-
ket, open-source alternatives were tried to be investigated. During the investigation FreeRADIUS
has shown a lot of attention in the market. As the developers point it out 28, FreeRadius is the
main Open source RADIUS server and the world’s most popular one. As jumpcloud 29 compares
FreeRADIUS and Cisco ISE, both solutions technically enable RADIUS protocol. There are mul-






4.3.3 Alternatives for Management Server
Cisco Stealthwatch which has integrated a number of features, such as IDPS, inside one server is
Cisco’s solution as a network management technology. There are a number of management servers
in the market. Zabbix 32 has been installed in many networks and has become an important player
on a market [91]. There is a comparison between Cisco Stealthwatch and Zabbix available by IT
Central Station 33, in which obviously number of available features by Cisco stands out. It is also
noted that Zabbix is easy to install and manage, stable, and scalable. There has been an effort to
initiate it as an appliance (on a VMware platform) that proved the ease of initialization.
4.3.4 Alternatives for Network Time Protocol
The current system suffers from unsynchronized time. The clients have difference in their times not
only by seconds, but by some minutes. As a starting point for time synchronization, an NTP server
could be implemented on the existing server. The clients could have the address of the NTP server
either being set manually or provided by the DHCP server. A DHCP server provides a number of
options to the clients. The option 42 34 would enable providing an IP address as the NTP Server.
The NTP server, itself, could have its time synchronized with the NTP Pool 35 available in Norway
36. Since there are not many components within the system, it is preferable to have the address of
the NTP server set manually on the clients and provide the option on the DHCP server for whoever
is being introduced to the system newly and temporarily.
4.3.5 Alternatives for IDPS
Studying different open-source options for Intrusion Detection systems, Isa and his colleagues have
published a comprehensive performance assessment on open source intrusion detection system [92],
referring to three different articles [93, 94], name two major products in the open source area. Of
these, Snort 37 has the most dominant market share, and Suricata 38 is one of its rivals. According
to a talk to security expert Snort was highly recommended as an open-source solution of IDPS.
Therefore, a preliminary testing, installing and initializing of it has been done.
4.3.6 DNS Response Policy Zones
Cisco Umbrella, formerly named as OpenDNS Enterprise service, facilitates the content filtering
service. The devices are configured to use Umbrella as their DNS Servers. Umbrella operates
as intermediate identity for the DNS requests, Cisco explain the functionality in more details [1,
p.100-102].
Domain Name Service Response Policy Zones (DNS RPZ) is a method that allows a nameserver










queries 39. RPZ could be set up in BIND Resolver on Debian/Ubuntu. Xiao Guoan has provided
an implementation guide 40.
4.3.7 Alternatives for Secure Remote Access
Cisco offers AnyConnect VPN service to supply a secure remote access (VPN connection). An
investigation of alternatives for such service is conducted. OpenVPN [95] has been used in different
solutions [96, 97, 98]. It has also shown a solid and portable implementation, where clients can
use standard sotware to connect to the real-time simulation system [96]. OpenNAC 41 has been
attempted to be initiated inside the system. Since the latest update for it was in 2015, there were
some problems with initiating it in the newer Operating systems (CentOS 8.3). On the other hand,
OpenVPN has been initiated quiet easily and finely which eases the further investigation of it.
4.3.8 Client-based Anti-malware and Firewalls
In case of endpoint protection, SAFE for IoT [1] only mentions Anti-malware technologies. While
in SAFE for campus networks [2], as a foundation of SAFE for IoT, it is expanded as client-
based security. The client-based security includes Anti-malware, Anti-virus, cloud security, and
personal firewall [2, p.10]. It is preferable to consider all the mentioned technologies, except the
cloud security which is not a part of the current and desired architecture. There are already some
consideration taken by the project owners. Thus, this part of security measures is not emphasized
on. Nonetheless, assuring the healthy performance of personal firewall and anti-virus of all client
devices is noteworthy.
4.3.9 Detected Vulnerabilities
As it was mentioned in section 3.2.4, services such as Penetration testing and vulnerability assess-
ment provide a better perspective of the system. After scanning all the clients of the network using
Nessus basic network scan, severity base CVSS v3.0 [99], 57 vulnerabilities were found. It should
be noted that there are some devices connected to the network, as a temporary user. The severity





Figure 4.6: The percentage of criticality of detected vulnerabilities using Nessus basic network scan
Due to security reasons the details about the detected vulnerabilities are not noted here.
Nonetheless, the details and solutions, which Nessus itself provides, are accorded to the project
owners.
5 Discussion
This section presents the discussions about the the project. The significance of network architecture
and a secure one is discussed firstly. Thereupon, the open-source alternatives of security capabilities,
required devices, and how to improve the overall system is debated.
5.1 A secure network architecture
Cisco SAFE approach focuses on defense-in-depth approach for securing both the business flow and
the TCP/IP protocol suite. Generally, network architecture is the bed of the TCP/IP protocol suite.
In other words, a network architecture is required to have TCP/IP perform upon it. Cisco SAFE
clears the fact that having a secure architecture priors securing TCP/IP protocol suite. To clarify
this argument, assume the system as a car. In order to construct a safe (secured) car, building
strong (secured) chassis is prior to strong functionality, like doors and ECU. Secondly, chassis are
designed to contain the potential of having strong functionality (components), such as bullet-proof
doors and glasses, mounted on them. In other words, the relation between the functionality and
chassis is mutual. Therefore, no strong functionality without a strong chassis is useful and efficient
and the chassis itself should contain the potential of holding strong components.
In the sense of network architecture and TCP/IP protocol suite, a secured and efficient net-
work architecture which considers security of TCP/IP is prior to securing TCP/IP. If a network
architecture itself is not well-designed and secured, then no security capability (firewall, IDS/IPS,
Encryption, Integrity service, ...) is efficient and functional enough.
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Therefore, the need for a well-established network architecture, the level of complexity and
inter-connectivity of the networks is tangible. This issue is not newly discussed and for many years
it has been faced and sought to be resolved. Thus, starting from the scratch trying to design a
secure network architecture which results in a secure system in general, is time consuming and
requires a vast area of knowledge which does not suit the scope of the project (approximately four
months) and the knowledge of the author; alternatively stated, utilizing a number of standards,
guidelines, policies, and risk assessments and building a secured system from the scratch. Further-
more, the defined project is meant to take actions and aid the client (The department of Industrial
Engineering) in practice. Hence, the effort is going through the conceptual parts as early as pos-
sible and yield actions. For this purpose, Cisco SAFE was enabled to accelerate the process from
analysis to implementation. Since security lives as a life-cycle, the next cycles would improve the
establishments too.
Cisco SAFE has provided a generalized template, including a network architecture and security
capabilities for general use-cases/business flows. Standing on the shoulder of giants and more im-
portantly, the fact that building a system that is commonly acceptable and used in the Industry,
brings us to the existing trend. This project would credit Cisco SAFE as a standing point. Utilizing
Cisco SAFE method (architecture), adjusting it based on the need of the project provide, and ap-
plying computer networking backgrounds, established the proposed network architecture including
proposed security capabilities.
5.2 Open-source security capabilities
The ongoing effort of establishing the suggested system is notable. Cisco has suggested its pro-
prietary technologies for the mentioned four fonts of overcoming threats (segmentation, visibility
and analysis, remote access, services). An investigation of open-source alternatives has been done,
which could become enhanced and more extensive. Benchmarks of different alternatives provide
constructive aid to select the best option. Nevertheless, it is required to implement and test the
efficiency of such choices for the specific CPS of this project. Although all networks share common
properties of data and data patterns, each network could have a specific type or pattern of data
differentiate the network. New tools and options are introduced on a daily basis, and there could
be alternatives that perform optimally for special scenarios.
Thus, a more extensive investigation of open-source security capabilities to enhance the security
system would be named as a noteworthy further work.
5.3 Required Devices
In order to fully accomplish the implementation of the proposed design, there is a need for pur-
chasing the proposed devices, the firewall(s), access points, wireless LAN controller and switches.
The firewall(s) is required to improve the segmentation font of Cisco SAFE and alleviating the dis-
cussed shortcoming regarding the absence of network traffic controlling. Access points and switches
are required for the connectivity of the devices and the wireless LAN controller enables handling
multiple access points and rouge access point detection.
This scope of work due to its complexities was not covered during this project. The process
requires a strong interaction with the department of industrial engineering. Moreover, the pro-
cedure is time-consuming in both sense of evaluation of alternatives, and receiving the purchased
alternative. Furthermore, analyzing the network traffic and grasping the details of it would provide
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insight on features that a firewall should own. Hence, enabling network analysis and management
services before finalizing any alternative for firewalls is an asset.
As the result, a thorough assessment of options for each type of device would be required to
approach the proposed network architecture excellently.
5.4 Security life-cycle
Last but not least, securing a system never ends. More cycles of the security life-cycle, as proposed
in section 3.3 is essential to provide a more secure system at all time. New standards, best practices,
and threats are introduced daily. Also, business needs could vary over time. The process of securing
a system never ends and devoting time and effort to cybersecurity is an inevitable principle. It could
be observed in CISSP [82], as one of most the valid security certificates, that a large scope of the
book is dedicated to establishing teams and managing them.
6 Conclusion
This thesis emphasizes on a network architecture and states three questions to approach a secure
cyber-physical system for the existing one in the department of industrial engineering at UiT campus
Narvik. The questions are: what a secure CPS architecture is, how far the current state of system
is from the defined secure architecture, and how to reach the proposed architecture. The emphasize
of the project is on the first question and proposing a secure robust network architecture. Because,
such architecture would ease identifying the security level of the current state and the required
security measures to improve it.
There are already some device hardening and endpoint security measures have been performed
in the network. Although device hardening or any security measures which are related to the
application layer of TCP/IP protocol suite (the higher layers) is a positive step toward security,
they would not be efficient and practical enough to make a system secure, unless the network
architecture is secure. A network architecture is the bed of the TCP/IP protocol suite. Therefore,
owning a secure network architecture priors to any other actions for securing the protocols or
applications executing over it.
As a fundamental step, this project has suggested a secure architecture based on Cisco SAFE ap-
proach for IoT. Cisco SAFE is easy-to-use, intuitive, and includes examples and clear explanations.
The whole of security for the system has been categorized in four fonts, segmentation, visibility and
analysis, remote access, and services. In other words, all the security measures considered in this
project are related to either one or more of the fonts. The result is a secure network architecture,
focusing on the availability principle of security, containing security capabilities that are placed
correctly in different segments of the network. Due to need of the project owner and the fact that
spending money is not favorable for them, all the suggested security capabilities are intended to be
open-source. Therefore, an investigation of the open-source alternatives for each security capability
is performed and presented.
A secure network architecture establishes a base in which security is acceptable. Comparing the
current architecture of the system with the proposed one besides utilizing the computer network-
ing fundamentals, resulted in identifying the six notable shortcomings of the current architecture.
Based on the identified flaws and computer networking fundamentals, the required technologies and
changes to the architecture, in order to enhance the security of the system, have been discussed as
the final part of this thesis. Precisely, nine distinguished security measures are noted.
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The everlasting procedure of securing a system mandates considering a life-cycle. Business
needs, threats, and solutions vary from time to time. Therefore, the selected security life-cycle of
this project would aid in constructing a durable and robust cyber-physical system.
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